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Abstract: Legislation is an important output of the political process. Growth in legislation 
can serve as a proxy for growth in the size and role of government, side-stepping some of the 
endogeneity problems encountered in estimating relationships between government spending 
and revenue and national income. This paper considers the relationship between government 
growth and real GDP per capita by developing three models of federal legislative output in 
Australia since the country’s founding in 1901. The models explain growth in (1) the number 
of acts of parliament; (2) the total number of pages of legislation enacted; and (3) a measure 
of legislative complexity based on the annual average number of pages per act. The growth in 
the number of acts is found to be negatively related to growth in real national income per 
capita in the short-run, implying that legislative output responds to temporary economic 
shocks, but without a robust long-run relationship with the level of income. The growth in the 
number of pages of legislation enacted and legislative complexity also show a negative short-
run relationship with growth in real national income per capita, but a positive long-run 
relationship with the level of income that is consistent with Wagner’s (1890) law of 
‘increasing state activity.’ However, both the short and long-run relationships are statistically 
significant only for the post-World War II period, raising questions about the general 
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Federal Legislative Activism in Australia: 
A New Approach to Testing Wagner’s Law 
 
1. Introduction 
Growth in government as a share of national income has been a stylised fact for most 
developed economies since the beginning of the 20
th century. Buchanan’s (1977, 5) 
taxonomy of theories of government growth divides them broadly into models of 
‘government by the people’ and ‘government against the people.’ Within the former category 
are models suggested by Wagner’s (1890) law of ‘increasing state activity,’ which maintains 
a positive relationship between the size of government and long-run economic development 
as proxied by real GDP per capita. Wagner’s ‘law’ has no definitive formulation (Peacock 
and Scott 2000), but in empirical settings is often interpreted as an income elasticity of 
growth in government greater than one, thereby accounting for growth in the government 
share of national income over time.  
Previous efforts at testing Wagner’s law have focused on the relationship between 
government spending or taxation and national income in both cross-sectional and time series 
settings (see e.g., Ram 1987; Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Oxley 1994), with mixed results. 
Durevall and Henrekson’s (2010, 4) review of the literature finds that 35% of studies obtain 
unqualified support for Wagner’s law, 35% fail to find support, while 30% find support 
conditioning on other variables or specific categories of government spending. Empirical 
tests of Wagner’s law in the Australian context have been inconclusive (Dollery and Singh 
2000; Chang, Liu, and Caudill 2004). Lindert (1996) has characterised ‘the notion that 
income growth will raise taxes and government spending, including social spending [as] the 
most durable black box in the whole rise-of-the-state literature.’  Potential endogeneity 
between government spending, revenue and economic growth has been a significant 
complication for empirical work. There are often substantial series or structural breaks in 
public sector accounts. Government spending and taxing may also be incomplete as a 
description of the size, scope and role of government. 
This paper takes a new approach to the issue of government growth by developing three 
models of federal legislative output in Australia since the country’s founding in 1901. Acts of 
federal parliament are among the most important outputs of the political process. New federal 
government policy initiatives and programs typically require enabling legislation, so the 
growth in federal legislation serves as a proxy for growth in government and may capture 
elements of both the size and scope of government. It should be noted that particular 
legislation could also reduce the role of government. For example, many deregulatory 
policies, tax reform and other economic liberalisation measures may require new laws or 
amendments to existing legislation to give effect to these policies. However, the expansion in 
the government expenditure and revenue shares of GDP over time implies that Australian 
government policies have generally expanded rather than reduced the role of government.  3 
 
Particular legislation may help, hinder or be irrelevant to overall economic activity, but total 
legislative output would not be expected to have systematic implications for national income.  
This is a useful property, in that we can make a plausible theoretical case that legislative 
output responds to contemporaneous or lagged national income along the lines suggested by 
Wagner’s law, but that legislation in aggregate does not determine real GDP per capita.  The 
growth in federal legislation may capture elements of growth in government not otherwise 
reflected in measures of government spending and revenue, while side-stepping some of the 
endogeneity issues that can arise in estimating relationships between these fiscal variables 
and national income.   
This paper estimates three models that seek to explain growth in (1) the number of acts of 
parliament; (2) the total number of pages of legislation enacted; and (3) a measure of 
legislative complexity based on the annual average number of pages per act.  The growth in 
the number of acts is found to be negatively related to growth in real GDP per capita in the 
short-run, but with little support for a long-run relationship with the level of real national 
income per capita. This implies that the legislative process responds to temporary economic 
shocks, with negative shocks leading to increased legislative output. The growth in pages of 
legislation enacted and legislative complexity also show a negative short-run relationship 
with growth in real national income per capita, but a positive long-run relationship with the 
level of income that is consistent with Wagner’s law. However, the results for all three 
models are robust only for the post-World War II period. A concluding section considers 
some of the implications of these results. 
 
2. The federal political process and legislative output 
A brief description of the federal political and legislative process is in order, as the 
institutions of Australian government have implications for the dynamics of growth in federal 
legislation (see McAllister et al (1997) for an overview of the Australian political system). 
Australia has a parliamentary system of government and a federal parliament comprised of 
two houses. The House of Representatives has been elected on the basis of a constituency-
based system since 1918. The Senate is elected via a proportional representation voting 
system within each state and territory. Acts of federal parliament require the support of both 
houses of parliament and are generally initiated by the governing party or coalition in the 
House of Representatives. Governments formed in the House of Representatives will often 
not enjoy a majority in the Senate. The division of power between the House of 
Representatives and Senate can result in new legislation being blocked or amended by non-
government parties. New acts of parliament may represent new legislation or may amend or 
repeal older legislation. Some ‘machinery’ legislation, such as the budget appropriation bills, 
is required at regular intervals, but are small in number compared to the overall legislative 
output of parliament. 
Governments formed in the House of Representatives are elected for a notional term of three 
years, but enjoy considerable discretion over the timing of the next general election.  The 4 
 
variable timing of federal elections disrupts the sitting schedule of federal parliament, so 
election years are often characterised by reduced legislative activity relative to non-election 
years. Figure 1 shows the number of acts passed by federal parliament for each calendar year 
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Acts of Federal Parliament, 1901-2009
 
Source: (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2005, 794) 
The chart shows steady growth in legislative activity from 1901 until the early 1970s, before 
stabilising in a very broad range. The number of pages of legislation has also increased over 
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Source: (Berg 2008). 
Dividing the number of pages of legislation enacted by the number of individual acts yields a 
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Source: derived from series in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
3. Data and order of integration tests 
In addition to the three measures of legislative output shown above, the following 
explanatory variables are used in subsequent empirical work (see Appendix for data sources 
and definitions): 
ELECTION is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in election years and zero 
otherwise to account for the disruptive effect of general elections on federal legislative 
activity.   
D
1907 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in 1907 and zero otherwise.  1907 is an 
outlier, with a record low 12 acts of parliament passed in that year. 
hours is the log of the number of hours the House of Representatives sits in a calendar year.  
The number of sitting hours varies from year to year for a variety of reasons, including 
federal elections and so has an influence on the quantity of legislative output. 
rgdp is the log of real GDP per capita. 7 
 
∆SOI is the June on June change in the Southern Oscillation Index.  Positive values of the 
index are associated with wetter than average conditions, negative values with drier than 
average conditions, with a historical mean approximately equal to zero.  The index captures 
the effects of rainfall on Australian agricultural output and thus serves as a proxy for 
exogenous shocks to agricultural output.   
WWII is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the years 1940-1945 to capture the 
disruptive effect of World War II on legislative activity and the increased reliance on 
executive rather than parliamentary authority in these years. 
It is necessary to test the orders of integration of the dependent and explanatory variables to 
determine the most appropriate specification for the three proposed empirical models.  Table 
1 shows ADF tests for the order of integration for the log of new acts of parliament (acts), the 
log of the number of new pages of federal legislation enacted (pages) and the log of the 
number of pages enacted divided by the number of new acts (complexity), as well as federal 
parliamentary sitting hours (hours) and real GDP per capita (rgdp).   
___________________________________________________________________________
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
Variable
(a) Lags
(b)   Constant  Constant & Trend 
acts   2/2   -2.025   -2.626 
∆acts   1/4   -12.977***  -8.328*** 
pages   2/1   -0.105   -5.384*** 
∆pages  1/1   -12.182***  -12.198***   
complexity  2/1   -0.172   -3.986** 
∆complexity 1/1    -11.136***  -11.383*** 
rgdp   2/2   0.4761   -1.844 
∆rgdp   1/1   -7.162***  -7.201*** 
hours   3/3   -3.977***  -4.219*** 
∆hours   1/1   -15.724***  -15.665*** 
 
Notes: (a) t-tests for ρ=1 in regressions of yt = α + ρyt-1 + εt and yt = α + βt + ρyt-1 + εt for 
sample period 1900-2008 or 2009.  ***,**,* denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance 
levels respectively. (b) Lag length for test with constant/constant and trend, chosen by SIC. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The integration tests find that the data are I(1) in levels, although pages and complexity are 
found to be stationary in levels with the inclusion of an exogenous trend, while hours is 
stationary in levels regardless of choice of exogenous regressors. Given uncertainty about 
whether the data are trend or first-difference stationary, the bounds testing procedure for level 
relationships suggested by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) can be employed to test the 
significance of the lagged levels of the variables of interest in a conditional unrestricted error 
correction framework. This approach allows testing of long-run relationships in a manner that 
is robust to the order of integration of the variables and the presence of cointegrating 
relationships. Standard errors for the estimated long-run relationships between variables in 8 
 
levels can be obtained using Bårdsen’s (1989) methodology. The non-standard critical values 
derived by Ericsson and Mackinnon (2002) can also be compared to the t-statistic on the 
lagged level of real GDP per capita to test for cointegration under the assumption that real 
GDP per capita is weakly exogenous for the three measures of legislative output. 
 
4. Empirical specification and results 
Three models are estimated by least squares using data for the period from 1900 to 2009 and 
for pre- and post-war sub-samples (1901-1945 and 1946-2009), adjusted for lags in variables 
and data availability.  Equation (1) takes the first-difference in the log of the number of acts 
passed (acts) as the dependent variable.  Equation (2) has the first-difference of the log of the 
number of pages enacted (pages) as the dependent variable.  Equation (3) takes the first-
difference of the log of the average number of pages per act (complexity) as the dependent 
variable. 
Equation (1) takes the following form: 
∆actst = α0 + α1∆actst-1 + α2∆actst-2 + α3∆actst-3 + α4∆hourst + α5ELECTIONt + α6D t
 
1907 + α7WWIIt + α8∆rgdpt-1 + α9∆SOIt + α10rgdpt + α11actst +  εt       (1) 




Table 3. Equation 1: Growth in Acts of Federal Parliament 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Full  Sample  Pre-War Post-War   
 
Constant  26.120   803.650**  79.257  
  (49.516)  (370.059)  (59.129) 
 
∆actst-1    -0.529*** -0.462*** -0.468***  
  (0.106)   (0.155)   (0.156) 
 
∆actst-2  -0.308***  -0.284* -0.320** 
  (0.105)   (0.161)   (0.143) 
 
∆actst-3    -0.226*** -0.400*** -0.080 
  (0.081)   (0.118)   (0.112) 
 
∆hourst  0.230*** 0.326*** 0.089 
  (0.085)   (0.105)   (0.156) 
   
ELECTIONt -0.171***  -0.165**  -0.194*** 




t   -0.904***  -1.149*** 
  (0.216)   (0.230)   
 
WWIIt   -0.203**  0.062 
  (0.088)   (0.150)   
 
∆rgdpt-1 -1.223* -0.043    -1.900* 
  (0.670)   (0.847)   (1.127) 
   
∆SOIt   -0.003**  -0.002   -0.004** 
  (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
 
rgdpt-1  0.065   -0.841* 0.094 
  (0.082)   (0.450)   (0.115) 
 
actst-1   -0.156**  -0.181*  -0.314** 
  (0.069)   (0.096)   (0.151) 
 
θ=α10/-α11  0.413   -4.643   0.299 
  (0.537)   (3.686)   (5.533) 
 
F-test of 
α10+α11=  0  6.051** 5.937** 7.853*** 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Adj. R
2 0.681   0.745   0.615 10 
 
S.E   19.96   19.89   18.16 
JB-test   {0.13}   {0.54}   {0.61} 
LM test 
-1
st  order {0.6702} {0.7532} {0.5730} 
-4
th  order {0.1504} {0.7326} {0.4663} 
BPG-test {0.5173} {0.5402} {0.2181} 
 
Notes: Sample period is 1905-2009.  Numbers in parentheses () are standard errors, those in 
braces {} are p-values. ***,**,* denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels 
respectively. F-test critical values based on Pesaran et al (2001). All variables are multiplied 
by 100 so coefficients are in percentages. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The lags of the dependent variable shows that growth in the number of acts follows a third-
order autoregressive process, which is likely driven by the three-year terms of the federal 
parliaments in which Australian governments are formed.  An increase in the hours federal 
parliament sits results in an increase in the quantity of legislation passed, although this effect 
is not statistically significant in the post-World War II period.  Federal election years reduce 
growth in the number of acts passed, consistent with their disruptive effect on the 
parliamentary schedule and legislative process.  World War II had a similarly negative effect, 
stemming from the disruptive effect of the war and the increased use of executive rather than 
legislative authority during the war years. The year 1907 is a statistically significant outlier, 
as previously noted. 
The coefficient on lagged growth in real GDP per capita implies that a one percent increase in 
real income per capita in the previous year yields a 1.2% decrease in the growth rate of acts 
of federal parliament in the current year, with a slightly larger coefficient in the post-World 
War II period, but only at the 10% level of statistical significance.  If the annual variation in 
growth in real GDP per capita is mainly driven by the business cycle rather than changes in 
permanent income, then this result implies that growth in the number of acts passed is driven 
by temporary economic shocks. The estimated response is consistent with negative economic 
shocks leading to increased legislative enactments to insulate political constituencies against 
economic adversity. This is also suggested by the (very small) negative coefficient on the 
change in the SOI, which captures weather-related shocks to farm output, although this result 
is also only statistically significant for the post-war period.    
The F-test for the joint significance of the lagged variables in levels exceeds the upper bound 
of the five percent critical values suggested by Pesaran et al’s (2001) bounds testing 
procedure for the full and pre-World War II sample period (FUpper = 4.85) and the one percent 
critical values for the post-war sample period (FUpper = 6.36). However, the estimated long-
run relationship shows considerable parameter instability and the large standard errors on the 
long-run coefficient (θ=α10/-α11) obtained using Bårdsen’s (1989) methodology argues 
against a robust long-run relationship between acts passed and the level of real GDP per 
capita.  The cointegration test proposed by Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) for the null of α11 
= 0 is not rejected, with a p-value of 0.3040 for the full sample, 0.4427 for the pre-war 
sample and 0.3247 for the post-war sample using their non-standard critical values (this test 11 
 
differs from the significance levels reported in the table). There is not a robust long-run 
relationship between acts passed and the level of real GDP per capita.  
Equation (2) models growth in pages and is given an error correction specification of the 
following form: 
∆pagest = α0 + α1∆pagest-1 + α2ELECTIONt + α3D t
 1907 + α4∆rgdpt-1 + 
α5rgdpt-1 + α6pagest-1 + εt          ( 2 )  




Table 4.  Equation 2: Growth in Pages of Federal Legislation 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Full  Sample  Pre-War Post-War   
 
Constant -779.037***  -159.328 -1018.335***   
  (213.466)  (404.990)  (208.99) 
 
∆pagest-1 -0.322***  -0.321** -0.1630*  
  (0.082)   (0.123)   (0.083) 
   
ELECTIONt -0.2504***  -0.285**  -0.219** 
  (0.080)   (0.136)   (0.084) 
  
D t
 1907   -1.758***  -1.912*** 
  (0.097)   (0.170)   
 
∆rgdpt-1 -2.815**  -2.262    -2.504 
  (1.278)   (1.807)   (1.761) 
   
rgdpt-1  1.211***  0.535   1.596*** 
  (0.317)   (0.502)   (0.308) 
 
 
pagest-1  -0.472*** -0.558*** -0.642*** 
  (0.121)   (0.171)   (0.118) 
 
θ=α5/-α6 2.569***  0.958    2.489*** 
  (0.152)   (0.825)   (0.149) 
 
F-test of 
α5+α6= 0  13.549***  0.003    22.401*** 
_______________________________________________________________________  
Adj. R
2 0.568   0.622   0.459 
S.E   35.711   43.490   29.545 
JB-test   {0.77}   {0.84}   {0.53} 
LM test 
-1
st order  {0.28}   {0.42}   {0.74} 
-4
th order  {0.30}   {0.21}   {0.76} 
BPG-test  {0.01}   {0.08}   {0.77} 
 
Notes: Sample period is 1903-2009.  Numbers in parentheses () are Newey-West HAC robust 
standard errors, those in braces {} are p-values. ***,**,* denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent 
significance levels respectively. F-test critical values based on Pesaran et al (2001). All 




Since the error variance for equation (2) shows signs of heteroskedasticity, robust standard 
errors are reported.  Lagged growth in real GDP per capita has a large effect on growth in the 
number of pages of legislation enacted, with an estimated elasticity of -2.8%.  This is 
consistent with the previous model in suggesting that legislative output responds to economic 
shocks.  In particular, there is an increase in legislative output in response to economic 
downturns that likely reflects an attempt to insulate political constituencies against adverse 
shocks. The magnitude is similar across sub-samples, although falls short of conventional 
levels of statistical significance in the sub-sample estimates.   
The F-test for the joint significance of the variables in levels exceeds the upper bound for the 
one per cent critical values derived by Pesaran et al (2001), although only for the post-World 
War II period. The long-run elasticity of growth in pages enacted with respect to the level of 
real GDP per capita is given by θ=α5/-α6, for which the reported standard errors are obtained 
using Bårdsen’s (1989) methodology.  The full-sample long-run elasticity is 2.6, although 
this result is driven by the post-World War II sample.  The pre-war sample does not yield 
statistically significant results. The positive long-run relationship between the level of real 
GDP per capita and the growth in pages enacted is consistent with Wagner’s law in 
suggesting that legislative output is positively related to economic development, as measured 
by the level of real GDP per capita, with an elasticity greater than one. The cointegration test 
proposed by Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) for the null of α6 = 0 is rejected, with a p-value 
of 0.0094 for the full sample, 0.0563 for the pre-war sample and 0.0000 for the post-war 
sample using their non-standard critical values (this test differs from the significance levels 
reported in the table). This points to a long-run relationship with the level of real GDP per 
capita, although again, only for the post-war period. 
Equation (3) models growth in complexity and is given an error correction specification of the 
following form: 
∆complexityt = α0 + α1∆complexityt-1 + α2D t
 1907 + α3∆rgdpt-1 + α4rgdpt-1 + 
α5complexityt-1 + εt           ( 3 )  




Table 4.  Equation 3: Growth in Complexity of Federal Legislation 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Full  Sample  Pre-War Post-War   
 
Constant -481.95***  376.999  -597.721***   
  (89.64)   (787.66)  (195.278) 
 
∆complexityt-1  -0.469*** -0.084    -0.468***  
  (0.076)   (0.193)   (0.083) 
 
∆complexityt-2 -0.182**  -0.012   -0.198*   
  (0.084)   (0.130)   (0.108) 
  
D t
 1907   -0.733***  -0.833*** 
  (0.072)   (0.156)   
 
∆rgdpt-1  -1.093   0.665   -1.173 
  (1.025)   (2.645)   (1.494) 
   
rgdpt-1  0.612***  -0.306   0.7334*** 
  (0.110)   (0.886)   (0.235) 
 
complexityt-1  -0.360*** -0.969*** -0.363*** 
  (0.063)   (0.316)   (0.118) 
 
θ=α4/-α5 1.700***  -0.316    2.023*** 
  (0.150)   (0.822)   (0.314) 
 
F-test of 
α4+α5= 0  15.588***  1.165    7.788*** 
_______________________________________________________________________  
Adj. R
2 0.431   0.4902   0.402 
S.E   30.568   36.076   25.233 
JB-test   {0.24}   {0.33}   {0.36} 
LM test 
-1
st order  {0.11}   {0.49}   {0.07} 
-4
th order  {0.08}   {0.28}   {0.33} 
BPG-test  {0.10}   {0.10}   {0.26} 
 
Notes: Sample period is 1905-2008.  Numbers in parentheses () are Newey-West HAC robust 
standard errors, those in braces {} are p-values. ***,**,* denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent 
significance levels respectively. F-test critical values based on Pesaran et al (2001). All 




The model for legislative complexity does not show a statistically significant short-run 
relationship with lagged growth in real GDP per capita, although the sign and magnitude of 
the coefficient is not inconsistent with that found for the other two measures of legislative 
output. The complexity proxy is designed to capture a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
dimension to legislative output and is more likely to respond to long-run economic 
development, as proxied by the level of real GDP per capita, than short-run shocks to growth 
in GDP per capita. The F-test for the joint significance of the lagged variables in levels 
exceeds the upper bound for the one per cent critical values derived by Pesaran et al (2001), 
for the full sample and the post-World War II period, but not the pre-war period. The long-
run relationship between legislative complexity and the level of real GDP per capita given by 
θ = α4/-α5 has an estimated elasticity of 1.7% for the full sample period. Again, this result is 
driven by the post-World War II sample period, for which the elasticity is 2%. The pre-war 
sample period does not yield statistically significant results. The cointegration test proposed 
by Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) for the null of α5 = 0 is rejected, with a p-value of 0.0000 
for the full sample, 0.0810 for the pre-war sample and 0.0773 for the post-war sample using 
their non-standard critical values (this test differs from the significance levels reported in 
Table 4). This points to a long-run relationship between complexity and the level of real GDP 
per capita, although the p-values for the sub-samples exceed the 5% significance level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The results from the three models estimated in this paper imply that legislative output 
responds to short-run economic shocks, with the political process responding to negative 
economic shocks with increased legislative activism in terms of both acts and the number of 
pages of legislation passed, but without a statistically significant effect on legislative 
complexity. Given that growth in real GDP per capita is positive on average, it is difficult to 
account for the long-run growth in federal legislative output with reference to these short-run 
dynamics. The empirical results suggest that there is a positive long-run relationship between 
legislative output, as measured by the number of pages enacted and legislative complexity 
and the level of real GDP per capita. This long-run relationship is consistent with Wagner’s 
law of increasing state activity, which suggests that growth in government is driven by long-
run trends in economic development that are captured by the level of real GDP per capita. 
While some contributions to the literature on Wagner’s law have found that this long-run 
relationship is driven by interactions between income and the age dependency ratio (Shelton 
2007), no role could be found for an Australian age dependency ratio variable in the 
empirical models developed in this paper. 
The lack of statistical support for either the short or the long-run relationship in the pre-
World War II sample places a question mark over the general applicability of these results 
and Wagner’s law. This finding is consistent with the increased government activism 
observed throughout the developed world in the post-war period, but may also indicate that 
there is no necessary long-run historical relationship between these proxies for government 
growth and national income. This is consistent with the results obtained by Durevall and 16 
 
Henrekson (2010) for Britain and Sweden, where Wagner’s law holds for specific periods in 
the two countries’ history, but not for others. The time frame and stage of economic 
development over which Wagner’s law is meant to apply has not been settled by previous 
theoretical or empirical work. It could be that Wagner’s law must attain a threshold condition 
for government size or scope that was not satisfied in Australia’s case until after World War 
II. Further research could test this proposition in a cross-country setting using a similar 





Data definitions and sources are as follows: 
acts is the log of the number of acts passed by the Australian federal parliament in a calendar 
year.  Source: House of Representatives Practice, 5
th edition, Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2005, Appendix 17.  Online version updated with data to 2009. 
ELECTION is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in calendar years that include 
federal elections and zero otherwise. Sources: McAllister et al (1997) and Barber et al (2008) 
hours is the log of the number of hours the House of Representatives sits in a calendar year.  
Source: House of Representatives Practice, 5
th edition, Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2005, Appendix 16.  Online version updated with data to 2009. 
pages is the log of the number of pages of federal legislation enacted annually. Source: Berg 
(2008). 
rgdp is the log of Australian real GDP per capita, 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP dollars.  Source: 
Angus Maddison, Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD,   
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. 
∆SOI (Southern Oscillation Index, is the June on June change in the standardised anomaly of 
the Mean Sea Level Pressure (MSLP) difference between Tahiti and Darwin, calculated as 
SOI = 10*[(Pdiff – Pdiffav)/SD(Pdiff)] where Pdiff = (average Tahiti MSLP for the month) - 
(average Darwin MSLP for the month), Pdiffav = long term average of Pdiff for the month in 
question, and SD(Pdiff) = long-term standard deviation of Pdiff for the month in question.  
Source: Australian Bureau of Meterology http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/glossary/soi.shtml, 
which includes a discussion of the effects of the SOI on Australian weather patterns. 
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